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Abstract 
In this paper, we adopt the neoclassical model of consumer choice and view students as a utility maximizer to 
investigate two implied issues caused by grade inflation – knowledge illusion and economic inefficiency in the 
knowledge market. These issues are important because they negatively impact the quality of higher education and 
weaken the signaling role of educational credentials in screening workers. More importantly, students eventually suffer 
a loss in well-being in the knowledge market and become less productive and competitive in the labor market.
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The relationship between student evaluations of teaching (SET) and grades has been broadly 
investigated  by  a  number  of  researchers,  such  as  Voeks  and  French (1960),  Kelly  (1972), 
Nichols and Soper (1972), Soper (1973), Mirus (1973), Tuckman (1975), Kau and Rubub (1976),
Danielsen and White (1976), Dilts (1980), Marlin and Niss (1980), Seiver (1983), Nelson and 
Lynch (1984), Aigner and Thum (1986), Zangenehzadeh (1988), Mehdizadeh (1990), Mason, 
Steagall, and Fabritius (1995), Krautmann and Sander (1999), Becker and Watts (1999), Grimes, 
Millea,  and  Woodruff (2004),  Isely  and  Singh  (2005),  McPherson  (2006), and  Lin  (2009b). 
These  studies  have  shown that  the  grades  expected  by students  and  student  evaluations  are 
positively and significantly correlated. However, some studies have not found a positive and 
significant relationship, such as Seiver (1993) and Decanio (1986). In addition to the empirical 
studies,  a  few  theoretical  studies  also  provided  the  same  conclusion  (e.g.,  Kelly,  1975; 
McKenzie,  1975;  Lichty,  Vose  and  Peterson,  1978;  Needham,  1978).  Kelly  (1975)  and 
McKenzie (1975) used the neoclassical  model of consumer choice and viewed  students as a 
utility maximizer. They focused on the influences of grades and grading structures on student 
evaluations. Lichty, Vose and Peterson (1978) extended the work done by Kelly (1975)  and 
McKenzie (1975) and further tested McKenzie’s hypothesis that a number of instructors might 
attempt to inflate students’ grades to maintain or enhance their evaluations from students. They 
concluded that grade inflation would eventually lead universities into the “Giffen” good case, if 
the practice never ended.
The  most  important  implication  for  student  evaluations  of  teaching is  grade  inflation. 
Although a  positive  and  significant  relationship  between professors’  overall  evaluations  and 
students’ grades
1 does not absolutely mean that grade inflation must exist, it does show that 
professors  must have an  incentive to inflate  grades. Simply speaking, student  evaluations of 
teaching might lead many instructors to intentionally inflate students’ grades in order to receive 
better evaluations from students. Here, it should be pointed out that we define “grade inflation” 
as instructors intentionally adopting some strategies (e.g., lowering the grading standard, creating 
easier exams, giving students extra bonuses [e.g., an attendance bonus], curving students’ grades, 
and avoiding some harder teaching  materials that should be taught) to raise students’ grades 
while these students do not exactly deserve those improved grades. 
Although a fair number of previous studies have examined and discussed the grade inflation 
issue,  none  investigated and discussed the  implied  issues caused  by grade  inflation, such as 
knowledge illusion and economic inefficiency in the knowledge market. These two issues are 
important because they may negatively impact the quality of higher education and thus further 
weaken the signaling role of educational credentials in screening workers. More importantly, 
students eventually will suffer a loss in well-being in the knowledge market and become less 
productive  and  competitive  in the  labor  market.  Therefore,  in  this  paper,  we  also  adopt the 
neoclassical model of consumer choice and view students as a utility maximizer (as done by 
Kelly [1975] and McKenzie [1975] previously) to investigate and discuss these two issues –
                                               
1 Lin (2009b) provided two possible explanations for the positive and significant effect: “one possible reason is that 
students’ grades (especially midterm grades) directly affect students’ emotional feelings, leading some (or many) 
students to use student evaluations of teaching to reward or exact revenge on their professors. Another possible 
reason is contamination of SETs by grades. That is, easy graders may receive better evaluations than hard graders 
due to their grading more easily.” 2
knowledge illusion and economic inefficiency in the knowledge market. These are the primary 
contributions of this paper. 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  First,  we  show  some  survey  evidence.  Second,  the 
neoclassical model of consumer choice is developed in order to discuss why students will suffer 
a loss in well-being in the knowledge market. Third, we further investigate why students will 
have knowledge illusion due to grade inflation, and discuss its effect on students’ productivity in 
the labor market. The conclusion may be found in the final section.       
2. Survey Evidence
In August  2008,  we developed a questionnaire  for another related  project. Four of these 
questions are related to this study and may be used to support our analysis. In that earlier study, 
we emailed the questionnaire to a random sample of 500 professors across the U.S. In total, 237 
professors responded to the questionnaire. The four questions pertinent to this paper were: (1)
“To  receive  higher ratings from students,  did  you  ever  intentionally  write  easier  exams?”  –
16.7% of the sample answered “yes”; (2) “To receive higher ratings from students, did you ever 
intentionally  curve  up  students’  midterm  exam  grades?”  –  13.3%  answered  “yes”;  (3)  “To 
receive higher ratings from students, did you ever intentionally give students extra bonuses (e.g., 
an  attendance  bonus)?” –  23.3%  answered  “yes”;  and  (4)  “To  receive  higher  ratings  from 
students, did you ever intentionally avoid some a little bit harder teaching materials that should 
be taught?” – 17.3% answered “yes”. These numbers (i.e., 16.7%, 13.3%, 23.3%, and 17.3%) do 
not seem to be large and significant; however, we believe that they would be larger and more 
significant if we removed the following words: “To receive higher ratings from students” and 
“intentionally”. One may argue that “I wrote easier exams, curved up students’ grades, or/and 
avoided some harder teaching materials not because I wanted to receive higher ratings from 
students, it was because I considered students’ quality” or “I gave students extra bonuses not 
because  I  wanted to  receive  higher  ratings  from  students,  it  was  because  I  attempted  to 
encourage students to attend the class and participate the class discussion”, and so  did not 
choose “yes”. At any rate, although those numbers (i.e., 16.7%, 13.3%, 23.3%, and 17.3%) are 
not large and significant, they still show that professors do have incentives to inflate students’ 
grades and grade inflation does exist in colleges and universities.
3. Economic Inefficiency in The Knowledge Market
Since grade inflation does exist, does it cause economic inefficiency (i.e., loss in well-being) 
in the knowledge market? In discussing this issue, we provide an economic analysis. 
We believe that the initial and main purpose of college attendance is to acquire knowledge.
Assume that students are a utility maximizer. Therefore, consider that a student can be satisfied 
by both leisure (denoted by l) and knowledge (denoted by k). That is, given the student’s other 
activities,  it  is  assumed  that  a  student  has  two  options:  leisure  or  increased  effort  toward 
studying.  Increased  effort  is  assumed  to  improve  knowledge.  Thus,  the  student  can  exert 
preferences over his/her leisure and knowledge, which means that the student’s utility function 
(denoted  by  V)  consists  of  both  leisure  and  knowledge  (assuming  that  both  leisure  and 
knowledge are normal goods); that is,    V V l k  , ; and Vl ,Vk > 0; Vll , Vkk  < 0; and V V lk kl  > 0. 
The price of leisure (denoted by P l ) can be viewed as the wage of working outside; and the price 3
of knowledge (denoted byP k) can be equal to the opportunity cost of acquiring knowledge. In 
addition, a student’s maximum time available for studying for a class is equal to , which is the 
student’s  maximum  opportunity  cost  for  studying  for  the  class;  namely,  the  student’s  total 
income. Thus, the student’s total budget can be specified as:  Pl P k l k    . Choosing l and k can 
solve the student’s optimization problem, which maximizes    V V l k  ,  subject to Pl P k l k    . 
It is assumed that both leisure and knowledge are continuously divisible. Hence, the first-order 
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According to  Equations  (1)  and (2), equilibriums   l P P l k
* , , and   k P P l k
* , ,  can  be  solved.  
Meanwhile, we further differentiate Equations (1) and (2) and obtain:   
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Let  D  be the determinant of the pre-multiplied matrix of vector    dl dk , which can be 
shown to be positive. Using Cramer’s rule, the straightforward comparative static analysis yields: 
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As shown in this economic analysis, each student will choose his or her optimal combination 
of leisure and knowledge (l* and k*) to maximize his or her utility (see Figure 1). Based upon 
this model, we are able to investigate whether or not grade inflation would cause a loss in well-4
being. Usually, there are five strategies for inflating students’ grades: (1) lowering the grading 
standard, (2) writing easier exams, (3) giving students extra bonuses (e.g., an attendance bonus), 
(4) grading on a curve, and (5) avoiding some more difficult teaching materials that should be 
taught. Professors may adopt some or all of them simultaneously. Here, we particularly focus on 
the fifth strategy because it will play a significant role in increasing the price of knowledge
( P k ). When professors intentionally avoid teaching materials that should be taught, students 
who want to learn those missed materials will need to spend extra time (and even more time) 
studying by themselves in the future, which will increase their costs of pursuing knowledge (i.e., 
P k ). For example, many professors who teach principles of microeconomics might skip the 
chapter on consumer theory & choices (the theory of marginal utility and indifference curve),
since this chapter contains more mathematical and abstract concepts that make it more difficult 
to teach and understand. Therefore, students who take upper-level economics classes (e.g., public 
finance
2) will have a difficult time grasping other concepts in these classes because they will use 
the theory of marginal utility and indifference curve. As a result, these students may either hire 
tutors to help them or spend more time studying. As shown in Equation (8), when the price of 
knowledge goes up, both substitution and income effects lead to a lower level of knowledge. 
What about the other four strategies? Will they also create a higher price of knowledge? We 
believe that the answer is yes. For example, if students know that their professors will create
easier exams and curve their grades eventually, they will not have strong incentives to study 
more and harder. Consequently, they will miss the knowledge that should be acquired. In the 
future, when they attend upper-level classes, they will face the same problem discussed earlier.
Therefore, as long as grade inflation exists, the price of knowledge will increase. 
Since the price  of knowledge will increase due  to grade inflation, given  P l  and  , the
budget  constraint  line  will  move  from  a’b’  to  a’c’.  As  a  consequence,  the  student’s  utility 
decreases from V1 to V2 (see Figure 1), implying that the student has suffered a loss in well-
being (i.e., the difference between V1 and V2) in the knowledge market. In other words, grade 
inflation negatively affects student demand for knowledge, which in turn results in a substitution 
effect. As long as the substitution effect exists, there will be a loss in well-being (i.e., excess 
burden or deadweight loss) caused by the substitution effect of price-distorting grade inflation. 
Simply speaking, economic inefficiency exists in the knowledge market due to grade inflation. 
4. Knowledge Illusion
In addition to economic inefficiency in the knowledge market, grade inflation may create 
knowledge illusion. To discuss this issue, we also provide an economic analysis.
Suppose that grade inflation does not exist initially; thus, we believe that students’ grades can 
exactly reflect the level of knowledge acquired. In other words, given the assumption of no grade 
inflation, students pursue their knowledge; at the same time, professors give them grades based 
upon how much knowledge they acquire. For this reason, grade (denoted by G) is a function of 
knowledge, i.e.,    G G k  , and 
dG
dk
 0. Thus, the student’s utility now consists of both leisure 
                                               
2 The prerequisites for public finance are only principles of microeconomics and principles of macroeconomics. 
Many business major students never take intermediate microeconomics before they take public finance although
professors who teach intermediate microeconomics will teach the chapter on the theory of consumer choice in more 
detail. 5
(l) and grade (G), which can be rewritten as:    V l G , , and Vl ,VG > 0; Vll , VGG < 0; and V V lG Gl 
> 0. The price of leisure is still P l ; and the price of grade is P G  (i.e., the opportunity cost of 
studying for the class to get a grade). The student’s total budget constraint does not change, but 
can be rewritten as: Pl P k Pl P G l k l G      . Now the student can choose l and G to solve 
his/her optimization problem, which maximizes    V V l G  ,  subject to Pl P G l G   . Note that 
one may argue that students’ grades are given by teachers rather than students, so how can a 
student choose his/her optimal grade to maximize his/her utility? As a matter of fact, students 
determined their grades, since with their initial human capital they determine the time and effort 
devoted to taking the class and studying for the exam. Teachers only determine the price of 
getting  a  grade.  That  is,  teachers  determine  the  grading  standard,  teaching  materials,  exam 
contents and so on. In addition, it is also assumed that both leisure and grade are continuously 
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Based upon the first-order conditions shown above (Equations [10] and [11]), we are able to 
solve equilibriums    l P P l G
* , , and   G P P l G
* , , , which are the student’s optimal combination 
of leisure (l*) and grade (G*) that maximize his or her utility (see Figure 2). Moreover, we 
further differentiate Equations (10) and (11) and obtain:   
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Let  D  be the determinant of the pre-multiplied matrix of vector    dl dG , which can be 
shown to be positive. Using Cramer’s rule, the straightforward comparative static analysis yields: 
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Nevertheless,  grade  inflation  occurs  (e.g.,  lowering  the  grading  standard,  creating  easier 
exams, giving students extra bonuses [e.g., an attendance bonus], curving students’ grades, and 
avoiding some harder teaching materials that should be taught). Therefore, the price of the grade 
goes down (i.e.,  P G  ), and hence the budget constraint line moves from a’b’ to a’d’ so that the 
student’s utility increases from V1 to V3 and the grade inflates from G* to G*** (see Figure 2 –
both  substitution  and  income  effects  lead  to  a  higher  grade,  as  shown  in  Equation  [17]). 
However, as discussed earlier, when grade inflation occurs, the price of knowledge will increase 
(i.e.,  P k ). If we take a closer look at this viewpoint – knowledge level, the student’s budget 
constraint line indeed moves from a’b’ to a’c’. Thus, the student’s utility decreases from V1 to 
V2 and the knowledge level diminishes from k* to k** (see Figure 2). Ironically, after grade 
inflation occurs, the student is happy to receive a higher grade (G*** > G*) but does not realize 
that he/she has acquired a lower level of knowledge (k** < k*). The most problematic outcome is 
that the student thinks that his/her knowledge level also has been enhanced from k* to k***, 
because he/she has received a higher grade (G***). For this reason, we may conclude that grade 
inflation leads students to inaccurately assess their level of knowledge.  
                
5. Conclusion
The initial purpose of student evaluations of teaching is to assess faculty performance in the 
classroom. Given that quality of teaching service cannot be easily monitored by a third party 
(including deans and department heads), the school authority believes that student evaluations 
can  be  an effective  mechanism  by which to control the  moral  hazard of teachers. However, 
according to our analysis, student evaluations of teaching are an incentive for teachers to inflate 
students’  grades,  and  in  turn  create  knowledge  illusion  and  economic  inefficiency  in  the 
knowledge market. The main problem for this system is that the school authority may ignore the 
fact that both students and teachers are economic individuals and thus will respond to each other 
via economic behavior (Lin, 2009a). 
Grade  inflation  is  an  important  issue  in  higher  education  because the  impacts  of  grade 
inflation not only eventually lead universities/colleges into the Giffen good case (Lichty, Vose 
and Peterson, 1978) but also lead students to hold illusions about their knowledge and suffer a 
loss in well-being in the knowledge market. Students who have knowledge illusion will not be 
inclined to learn and study more, and thus will be less productive and competitive in the labor 
market.  More  importantly,  such  inflation  will weaken  the  signaling  role  of  educational 
credentials in screening workers because it may foster a loss of trust in students from certain 
universities and colleges. 
Finally, given that student evaluations of teaching cannot be replaced, we suggested that the 
school authority reduce the weight attached to teaching evaluations in annual faculty evaluations 
and tenure and promotion, because doing so will decrease teachers’ incentives to inflate grades.7
Once the incentives are reduced, grade inflation will improve, and therefore knowledge illusion 
and economic inefficiency in the knowledge market will also eventually amend.
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Figure 1: Student’s Indifference Curve when  P k 
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